The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Nos últimos anos, a adoção de Software as a Service (SaaS) em nuvem ultrapassou o de Infraestrutura como um serviço (IaaS) em nuvem e agora é o foco de atenção na computação em nuvem. O mercado de nuvem está se tornando altamente competitivo devido ao número crescente de provedores de serviços de nuvem (CSPs), que provavelmente apresentarão diferentes capacidades de nuvem, ou seja, o mercado de nuvem é heterogêneo. Além disso, como diferentes utilizadores geralmente apresentam diferentes preferências de Qualidade de Serviço (QoS), é um desafio definir preços para serviços em nuvem com boa QoS. Neste estudo, investigamos a competição de preços no mercado heterogêneo de nuvem onde dois provedores de SaaS, denotados por CSP1 e CSP2, aluga instâncias de máquinas virtuais (VM) de provedores de IaaS para oferecer serviços de aplicativos baseados em nuvem aos usuários. Assumimos que CSP1 só tem fila M/M/1 de instâncias de VM devido aos seus recursos de nuvem limitados, enquanto o CSP2 possui fila M/M/∞ de instâncias de VM refletindo seus recursos adequados. Consideramos dois cenários de competição de preços em que dois CSPs se envolvem em dois jogos: um é um jogo estratégico não cooperativo (NSG), onde os dois CSPs definem preços simultaneamente e o outro é um jogo de Stackelberg (SG), onde o CSP2 define o preço primeiro como líder e é seguido pelo CSP1, que define o preço em resposta ao CSP2. Cada usuário decide quais serviços em nuvem comprar (se as compras forem feitas) com base nos preços e na QoS. O cenário NSG corresponde ao mercado prático de nuvem, onde dois CSPs com diferentes capacidades de nuvem começam a oferecer serviços de nuvem simultaneamente; enquanto isso, o cenário SG abrange o caso em que um CSP mais recente planeja entrar em um mercado de nuvem cujo CSP atual possui maiores recursos de nuvem. O equilíbrio é alcançado em cada um dos cenários. Resultados numéricos são apresentados para verificar nossa análise teórica.
Xianwei LI
Waseda University
Bo GU
Kogakuin University
Cheng ZHANG
Waseda University
Zhi LIU
Shizuoka University
Kyoko YAMORI
Asahi University,Waseda University
Yoshiaki TANAKA
Waseda University
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Xianwei LI, Bo GU, Cheng ZHANG, Zhi LIU, Kyoko YAMORI, Yoshiaki TANAKA, "Optimal Pricing for Service Provision in Heterogeneous Cloud Market" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E102-B, no. 6, pp. 1148-1159, June 2019, doi: 10.1587/transcom.2018EBP3201.
Abstract: In recent years, the adoption of Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud services has surpassed that of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud service and is now the focus of attention in cloud computing. The cloud market is becoming highly competitive owing to the increasing number of cloud service providers (CSPs), who are likely to exhibit different cloud capacities, i.e., the cloud market is heterogeneous. Moreover, as different users generally exhibit different Quality of Service (QoS) preferences, it is challenging to set prices for cloud services of good QoS. In this study, we investigate the price competition in the heterogeneous cloud market where two SaaS providers, denoted by CSP1 and CSP2, lease virtual machine (VM) instances from IaaS providers to offer cloud-based application services to users. We assume that CSP1 only has M/M/1 queue of VM instances owing to its limited cloud resources, whereas CSP2 has M/M/∞ queue of VM instances reflecting its adequate resources. We consider two price competition scenarios in which two CSPs engage in two games: one is a noncooperative strategic game (NSG) where the two CSPs set prices simultaneously and the other is a Stackelberg game (SG) where CSP2 sets the price first as the leader and is followed by CSP1, who sets the price in response to CSP2. Each user decides which cloud services to purchase (if purchases are to be made) based on the prices and QoS. The NSG scenario corresponds to the practical cloud market, where two CSPs with different cloud capacities begin to offer cloud services simultaneously; meanwhile, the SG scenario covers the instance where a more recent CSP plans to enter a cloud market whose incumbent CSP has larger cloud resources. Equilibrium is achieved in each of the scenarios. Numerical results are presented to verify our theoretical analysis.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.2018EBP3201/_p
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@ARTICLE{e102-b_6_1148,
author={Xianwei LI, Bo GU, Cheng ZHANG, Zhi LIU, Kyoko YAMORI, Yoshiaki TANAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Optimal Pricing for Service Provision in Heterogeneous Cloud Market},
year={2019},
volume={E102-B},
number={6},
pages={1148-1159},
abstract={In recent years, the adoption of Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud services has surpassed that of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud service and is now the focus of attention in cloud computing. The cloud market is becoming highly competitive owing to the increasing number of cloud service providers (CSPs), who are likely to exhibit different cloud capacities, i.e., the cloud market is heterogeneous. Moreover, as different users generally exhibit different Quality of Service (QoS) preferences, it is challenging to set prices for cloud services of good QoS. In this study, we investigate the price competition in the heterogeneous cloud market where two SaaS providers, denoted by CSP1 and CSP2, lease virtual machine (VM) instances from IaaS providers to offer cloud-based application services to users. We assume that CSP1 only has M/M/1 queue of VM instances owing to its limited cloud resources, whereas CSP2 has M/M/∞ queue of VM instances reflecting its adequate resources. We consider two price competition scenarios in which two CSPs engage in two games: one is a noncooperative strategic game (NSG) where the two CSPs set prices simultaneously and the other is a Stackelberg game (SG) where CSP2 sets the price first as the leader and is followed by CSP1, who sets the price in response to CSP2. Each user decides which cloud services to purchase (if purchases are to be made) based on the prices and QoS. The NSG scenario corresponds to the practical cloud market, where two CSPs with different cloud capacities begin to offer cloud services simultaneously; meanwhile, the SG scenario covers the instance where a more recent CSP plans to enter a cloud market whose incumbent CSP has larger cloud resources. Equilibrium is achieved in each of the scenarios. Numerical results are presented to verify our theoretical analysis.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.2018EBP3201},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={June},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Optimal Pricing for Service Provision in Heterogeneous Cloud Market
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 1148
EP - 1159
AU - Xianwei LI
AU - Bo GU
AU - Cheng ZHANG
AU - Zhi LIU
AU - Kyoko YAMORI
AU - Yoshiaki TANAKA
PY - 2019
DO - 10.1587/transcom.2018EBP3201
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E102-B
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - June 2019
AB - In recent years, the adoption of Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud services has surpassed that of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud service and is now the focus of attention in cloud computing. The cloud market is becoming highly competitive owing to the increasing number of cloud service providers (CSPs), who are likely to exhibit different cloud capacities, i.e., the cloud market is heterogeneous. Moreover, as different users generally exhibit different Quality of Service (QoS) preferences, it is challenging to set prices for cloud services of good QoS. In this study, we investigate the price competition in the heterogeneous cloud market where two SaaS providers, denoted by CSP1 and CSP2, lease virtual machine (VM) instances from IaaS providers to offer cloud-based application services to users. We assume that CSP1 only has M/M/1 queue of VM instances owing to its limited cloud resources, whereas CSP2 has M/M/∞ queue of VM instances reflecting its adequate resources. We consider two price competition scenarios in which two CSPs engage in two games: one is a noncooperative strategic game (NSG) where the two CSPs set prices simultaneously and the other is a Stackelberg game (SG) where CSP2 sets the price first as the leader and is followed by CSP1, who sets the price in response to CSP2. Each user decides which cloud services to purchase (if purchases are to be made) based on the prices and QoS. The NSG scenario corresponds to the practical cloud market, where two CSPs with different cloud capacities begin to offer cloud services simultaneously; meanwhile, the SG scenario covers the instance where a more recent CSP plans to enter a cloud market whose incumbent CSP has larger cloud resources. Equilibrium is achieved in each of the scenarios. Numerical results are presented to verify our theoretical analysis.
ER -