The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Redes tolerantes a atrasos (DTNs) são vulneráveis a ataques de inundação de mensagens, nos quais um grande número de mensagens maliciosas é enviado, esgotando os recursos da rede. Para resolver este problema, estudos anteriores focaram principalmente em restringir o número de mensagens que os nós podem gerar por intervalo de tempo, permitindo que os nós monitorem o histórico de comunicação dos outros nós. Como os adversários podem esconder seus ataques alegando um histórico falso, os nós trocam seus históricos de comunicação e detectam um invasor que apresentou um histórico de comunicação inconsistente. No entanto, esta abordagem aumenta o consumo de energia do nó, uma vez que o número de históricos de comunicação aumenta cada vez que um nó se comunica com outro nó. Para lidar com este problema, neste artigo, propomos uma defesa energeticamente eficiente contra tais ataques de inundação de mensagens. A ideia principal do esquema proposto é limitar no tempo a troca do histórico de comunicação de modo a reduzir o volume e ao mesmo tempo garantir a detecção eficaz de inconsistências. A vantagem desta abordagem é que, ao remover os históricos de comunicação após terem revelado tais inconsistências, o consumo de energia é reduzido. Para estimar esse tempo de expiração, são derivadas expressões analíticas baseadas em um modelo de propagação de mensagens baseado em cadeia de Markov para a probabilidade de que um histórico de comunicação revele tal inconsistência em um tempo arbitrário. Resultados extensivos de avaliação de desempenho obtidos por meio de simulações computacionais e vários critérios de desempenho verificam que o esquema proposto melhora com sucesso a eficiência energética geral. Por exemplo, estes resultados de desempenho mostraram que, em comparação com outras defesas anteriormente conhecidas contra ataques de inundação de mensagens, o esquema proposto prolonga em pelo menos 22% a vida útil da bateria dos nós DTN, mantendo os mesmos níveis de proteção.
Hiromu ASAHINA
Keio University
Keisuke ARAI
Keio University
Shuichiro HARUTA
Keio University
P. Takis MATHIOPOULOS
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Iwao SASASE
Keio University
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Hiromu ASAHINA, Keisuke ARAI, Shuichiro HARUTA, P. Takis MATHIOPOULOS, Iwao SASASE, "An Energy-Efficient Defense against Message Flooding Attacks in Delay Tolerant Networks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E104-B, no. 4, pp. 348-359, April 2021, doi: 10.1587/transcom.2020EBP3085.
Abstract: Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are vulnerable to message flooding attacks in which a very large number of malicious messages are sent so that network resources are depleted. To address this problem, previous studies mainly focused on constraining the number of messages that nodes can generate per time slot by allowing nodes to monitor the other nodes' communication history. Since the adversaries may hide their attacks by claiming a false history, nodes exchange their communication histories and detect an attacker who has presented an inconsistent communication history. However, this approach increases node energy consumption since the number of communication histories increases every time a node communicates with another node. To deal with this problem, in this paper, we propose an energy-efficient defense against such message flooding attacks. The main idea of the proposed scheme is to time limit the communication history exchange so as to reduce the volume while ensuring the effective detection of inconsistencies. The advantage of this approach is that, by removing communication histories after they have revealed such inconsistencies, the energy consumption is reduced. To estimate such expiration time, analytical expressions based upon a Markov chain based message propagation model, are derived for the probability that a communication history reveals such inconsistency in an arbitrary time. Extensive performance evaluation results obtained by means of computer simulations and several performance criteria verify that the proposed scheme successfully improves the overall energy efficiency. For example, these performance results have shown that, as compared to other previously known defenses against message flooding attacks, the proposed scheme extends by at least 22% the battery lifetime of DTN nodes, while maintaining the same levels of protection.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.2020EBP3085/_p
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@ARTICLE{e104-b_4_348,
author={Hiromu ASAHINA, Keisuke ARAI, Shuichiro HARUTA, P. Takis MATHIOPOULOS, Iwao SASASE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={An Energy-Efficient Defense against Message Flooding Attacks in Delay Tolerant Networks},
year={2021},
volume={E104-B},
number={4},
pages={348-359},
abstract={Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are vulnerable to message flooding attacks in which a very large number of malicious messages are sent so that network resources are depleted. To address this problem, previous studies mainly focused on constraining the number of messages that nodes can generate per time slot by allowing nodes to monitor the other nodes' communication history. Since the adversaries may hide their attacks by claiming a false history, nodes exchange their communication histories and detect an attacker who has presented an inconsistent communication history. However, this approach increases node energy consumption since the number of communication histories increases every time a node communicates with another node. To deal with this problem, in this paper, we propose an energy-efficient defense against such message flooding attacks. The main idea of the proposed scheme is to time limit the communication history exchange so as to reduce the volume while ensuring the effective detection of inconsistencies. The advantage of this approach is that, by removing communication histories after they have revealed such inconsistencies, the energy consumption is reduced. To estimate such expiration time, analytical expressions based upon a Markov chain based message propagation model, are derived for the probability that a communication history reveals such inconsistency in an arbitrary time. Extensive performance evaluation results obtained by means of computer simulations and several performance criteria verify that the proposed scheme successfully improves the overall energy efficiency. For example, these performance results have shown that, as compared to other previously known defenses against message flooding attacks, the proposed scheme extends by at least 22% the battery lifetime of DTN nodes, while maintaining the same levels of protection.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.2020EBP3085},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={April},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - An Energy-Efficient Defense against Message Flooding Attacks in Delay Tolerant Networks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 348
EP - 359
AU - Hiromu ASAHINA
AU - Keisuke ARAI
AU - Shuichiro HARUTA
AU - P. Takis MATHIOPOULOS
AU - Iwao SASASE
PY - 2021
DO - 10.1587/transcom.2020EBP3085
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E104-B
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - April 2021
AB - Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are vulnerable to message flooding attacks in which a very large number of malicious messages are sent so that network resources are depleted. To address this problem, previous studies mainly focused on constraining the number of messages that nodes can generate per time slot by allowing nodes to monitor the other nodes' communication history. Since the adversaries may hide their attacks by claiming a false history, nodes exchange their communication histories and detect an attacker who has presented an inconsistent communication history. However, this approach increases node energy consumption since the number of communication histories increases every time a node communicates with another node. To deal with this problem, in this paper, we propose an energy-efficient defense against such message flooding attacks. The main idea of the proposed scheme is to time limit the communication history exchange so as to reduce the volume while ensuring the effective detection of inconsistencies. The advantage of this approach is that, by removing communication histories after they have revealed such inconsistencies, the energy consumption is reduced. To estimate such expiration time, analytical expressions based upon a Markov chain based message propagation model, are derived for the probability that a communication history reveals such inconsistency in an arbitrary time. Extensive performance evaluation results obtained by means of computer simulations and several performance criteria verify that the proposed scheme successfully improves the overall energy efficiency. For example, these performance results have shown that, as compared to other previously known defenses against message flooding attacks, the proposed scheme extends by at least 22% the battery lifetime of DTN nodes, while maintaining the same levels of protection.
ER -