The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Consideramos as medições incompatíveis no protocolo de distribuição de chaves quânticas BB84, no qual as bases de medição são diferentes das bases de transmissão. Fornecemos um limite inferior para a quantidade de uma chave secreta que pode ser extraída das medições incompatíveis. Nosso limite inferior mostra que podemos extrair uma chave secreta das medições incompatíveis com certos canais quânticos, como o canal sobre o qual a matriz de Hadamard é aplicada a cada qubit com alta probabilidade. Além disso, o princípio da incerteza entrópica implica que não se pode extrair a chave secreta tanto das medições correspondentes como das incompatíveis simultaneamente, quando utilizamos o procedimento padrão de reconciliação de informações e amplificação de privacidade.
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Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO, Shun WATANABE, "Key Rate Available from Mismatched Measurements in the BB84 Protocol and the Uncertainty Principle" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E91-A, no. 10, pp. 2870-2873, October 2008, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870.
Abstract: We consider the mismatched measurements in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, in which measuring bases are different from transmitting bases. We give a lower bound on the amount of a secret key that can be extracted from the mismatched measurements. Our lower bound shows that we can extract a secret key from the mismatched measurements with certain quantum channels, such as the channel over which the Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high probability. Moreover, the entropic uncertainty principle implies that one cannot extract the secret key from both matched measurements and mismatched ones simultaneously, when we use the standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870/_p
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@ARTICLE{e91-a_10_2870,
author={Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO, Shun WATANABE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Key Rate Available from Mismatched Measurements in the BB84 Protocol and the Uncertainty Principle},
year={2008},
volume={E91-A},
number={10},
pages={2870-2873},
abstract={We consider the mismatched measurements in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, in which measuring bases are different from transmitting bases. We give a lower bound on the amount of a secret key that can be extracted from the mismatched measurements. Our lower bound shows that we can extract a secret key from the mismatched measurements with certain quantum channels, such as the channel over which the Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high probability. Moreover, the entropic uncertainty principle implies that one cannot extract the secret key from both matched measurements and mismatched ones simultaneously, when we use the standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={October},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Key Rate Available from Mismatched Measurements in the BB84 Protocol and the Uncertainty Principle
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2870
EP - 2873
AU - Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO
AU - Shun WATANABE
PY - 2008
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E91-A
IS - 10
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - October 2008
AB - We consider the mismatched measurements in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, in which measuring bases are different from transmitting bases. We give a lower bound on the amount of a secret key that can be extracted from the mismatched measurements. Our lower bound shows that we can extract a secret key from the mismatched measurements with certain quantum channels, such as the channel over which the Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high probability. Moreover, the entropic uncertainty principle implies that one cannot extract the secret key from both matched measurements and mismatched ones simultaneously, when we use the standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure.
ER -