The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Neste artigo, propomos um protocolo de troca de chaves autenticado por senha bastante simples, que é comprovadamente seguro no modelo padrão sob as três suposições a seguir. (1) O problema DDH (Decisão Diffie-Hellman) é difícil. (2) A entropia da senha é grande o suficiente para evitar a pesquisa exaustiva on-line (mas não necessariamente a pesquisa exaustiva off-line). (3) O MAC é seletivamente impossível de ser falsificado contra ataques de mensagens parcialmente escolhidas (o que é mais fraco do que ser existencialmente impossível de ser falsificado contra ataques de mensagens escolhidas).
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Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI, "Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Protocol Proven to be Secure in the Standard Model" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E85-A, no. 10, pp. 2229-2237, October 2002, doi: .
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_10_2229/_p
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@ARTICLE{e85-a_10_2229,
author={Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Protocol Proven to be Secure in the Standard Model},
year={2002},
volume={E85-A},
number={10},
pages={2229-2237},
abstract={In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={October},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Protocol Proven to be Secure in the Standard Model
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2229
EP - 2237
AU - Kazukuni KOBARA
AU - Hideki IMAI
PY - 2002
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E85-A
IS - 10
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - October 2002
AB - In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).
ER -