The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Este artigo aborda o problema de projetar um sistema de conferência incondicionalmente seguro que atenda aos requisitos de ambos rastreabilidade e remetente dinâmico. Num chamado sistema de conferência, uma chave comum é compartilhada entre todos os usuários autorizados e as mensagens são criptografadas usando a chave compartilhada. Sabe-se que uma implementação simples de tal sistema pode apresentar uma série de falhas de segurança. A nossa preocupação particular reside na possibilidade de que utilizadores não autorizados possam adquirir a chave partilhada por meios ilegais, por exemplo, de um ou mais utilizadores autorizados mas desonestos (chamados traidores). Um usuário não autorizado que obteve a chave compartilhada com sucesso agora pode descriptografar mensagens embaralhadas sem deixar qualquer evidência de quem eram os traidores. Para resolver este problema, neste artigo propomos um sistema de conferência que admite rastreabilidade dinâmica do remetente. A nova solução pode detectar traidores, mesmo que o remetente de uma mensagem seja determinado dinamicamente após a distribuição de uma chave compartilhada a usuários autorizados. Também provamos que este esquema é incondicionalmente seguro.
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Goichiro HANAOKA, Junji SHIKATA, Yuliang ZHENG, Hideki IMAI, "A Traitor Traceable Conference System with Dynamic Sender" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E85-A, no. 1, pp. 167-174, January 2002, doi: .
Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of designing an unconditionally secure conference system that fulfills the requirements of both traceability and dynamic sender. In a so-called conference system, a common key is shared among all authorized users, and messages are encrypted using the shared key. It is known that a straightforward implementation of such a system may present a number of security weaknesses. Our particular concern lies in the possibility that unauthorized users may be able to acquire the shared key by illegal means, say from one or more authorized but dishonest users (called traitors). An unauthorized user who has successfully obtained the shared key can now decrypt scrambled messages without leaving any evidence on who the traitors were. To solve this problem, in this paper we propose a conference system that admits dynamic sender traceability. The new solution can detect traitors, even if the sender of a message is dynamically determined after a shared key is distributed to authorized users. We also prove that this scheme is unconditionally secure.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_1_167/_p
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@ARTICLE{e85-a_1_167,
author={Goichiro HANAOKA, Junji SHIKATA, Yuliang ZHENG, Hideki IMAI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A Traitor Traceable Conference System with Dynamic Sender},
year={2002},
volume={E85-A},
number={1},
pages={167-174},
abstract={This paper addresses the problem of designing an unconditionally secure conference system that fulfills the requirements of both traceability and dynamic sender. In a so-called conference system, a common key is shared among all authorized users, and messages are encrypted using the shared key. It is known that a straightforward implementation of such a system may present a number of security weaknesses. Our particular concern lies in the possibility that unauthorized users may be able to acquire the shared key by illegal means, say from one or more authorized but dishonest users (called traitors). An unauthorized user who has successfully obtained the shared key can now decrypt scrambled messages without leaving any evidence on who the traitors were. To solve this problem, in this paper we propose a conference system that admits dynamic sender traceability. The new solution can detect traitors, even if the sender of a message is dynamically determined after a shared key is distributed to authorized users. We also prove that this scheme is unconditionally secure.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A Traitor Traceable Conference System with Dynamic Sender
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 167
EP - 174
AU - Goichiro HANAOKA
AU - Junji SHIKATA
AU - Yuliang ZHENG
AU - Hideki IMAI
PY - 2002
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E85-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2002
AB - This paper addresses the problem of designing an unconditionally secure conference system that fulfills the requirements of both traceability and dynamic sender. In a so-called conference system, a common key is shared among all authorized users, and messages are encrypted using the shared key. It is known that a straightforward implementation of such a system may present a number of security weaknesses. Our particular concern lies in the possibility that unauthorized users may be able to acquire the shared key by illegal means, say from one or more authorized but dishonest users (called traitors). An unauthorized user who has successfully obtained the shared key can now decrypt scrambled messages without leaving any evidence on who the traitors were. To solve this problem, in this paper we propose a conference system that admits dynamic sender traceability. The new solution can detect traitors, even if the sender of a message is dynamically determined after a shared key is distributed to authorized users. We also prove that this scheme is unconditionally secure.
ER -