The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Vários ataques contra RC5 foram analisados intensivamente. Não foi relatado que um ataque de texto simples conhecido funcione em uma rodada tão superior quanto um ataque de texto simples escolhido, mas pode funcionar de forma mais eficiente e prática. Neste artigo, investigamos um ataque de texto simples conhecido contra RC5, melhorando um ataque de correlação. Quanto a um ataque de texto simples conhecido contra RC5, o resultado mais conhecido é uma criptoanálise linear. Eles relataram que o RC5-32 com 10 tiros pode ser quebrado por 264 textos simples sob a suposição heurística: RC5-32 com r rodadas podem ser quebradas com uma probabilidade de sucesso de 90% usando 26r + 4 textos simples. No entanto, a sua suposição parece ser altamente otimista. Nosso conhecido ataque de correlação de texto simples pode quebrar RC5-32 com 10 rodadas (20 meias rodadas) em um sentido mais estrito, com uma probabilidade de sucesso de 90% usando 263.67 textos simples. Além disso, nosso ataque pode quebrar RC5-32 com 21 meias rodadas com uma probabilidade de sucesso de 30% usando 263.07 textos simples.
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Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, "Improved Correlation Attack on RC5" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E85-A, no. 1, pp. 44-57, January 2002, doi: .
Abstract: Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_1_44/_p
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@ARTICLE{e85-a_1_44,
author={Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Improved Correlation Attack on RC5},
year={2002},
volume={E85-A},
number={1},
pages={44-57},
abstract={Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Improved Correlation Attack on RC5
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 44
EP - 57
AU - Atsuko MIYAJI
AU - Masao NONAKA
AU - Yoshinori TAKII
PY - 2002
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E85-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2002
AB - Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.
ER -