The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
A família de problemas de correspondência estável tem sido bem estudada em um amplo campo de áreas de pesquisa, incluindo economia, matemática e ciência da computação. Em geral, um exemplo de um problema de correspondência estável é dado por um conjunto de participantes que expressaram as suas preferências uns dos outros, e pede para encontrar uma correspondência “estável”, isto é, um emparelhamento dos participantes tal que nenhum participante não emparelhado prefira entre si aos seus parceiros designados. No caso do Problema dos Companheiros de Quarto Estáveis (SR), sabe-se que dado um número par n de participantes, pode não existir uma correspondência estável que emparelhe todos os participantes, mas existem algoritmos eficientes para determinar se isso é possível ou não e, se for possível, produzir tal correspondência. Extensões comuns de RS permitem que as listas de preferências dos participantes sejam incompletas ou incluam indiferença. Permitir a indiferença, por sua vez, dá origem a diferentes definições possíveis de estabilidade, estabilidade super, forte e fraca. Embora instâncias que solicitam correspondência super e fortemente estável possam ser resolvidas com eficiência mesmo se as listas de preferências estiverem incompletas, o caso de estabilidade fraca é NP-completo. Examinamos um caso restrito de indiferença, introduzindo o conceito de sem classificação entradas. Para este tipo de instâncias, mostramos que o problema de encontrar um emparelhamento fracamente estável permanece NP-completo mesmo que cada participante tenha uma lista de preferências completa com no máximo duas entradas não classificadas, ou seja ela própria não classificada para até três outros participantes. Por outro lado, para os casos em que existem m pares aceitáveis e existem no total k entradas não classificadas em todas as listas de preferências dos participantes, propomos um O(2kn2)-algoritmo de tempo e espaço polinomial que encontra uma correspondência estável ou determina que nenhuma existe na instância fornecida.
Hiroaki SUTO
Kyoto University
Aleksandar SHURBEVSKI
Kyoto University
Hiroshi NAGAMOCHI
Kyoto University
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Hiroaki SUTO, Aleksandar SHURBEVSKI, Hiroshi NAGAMOCHI, "The Stable Roommates Problem with Unranked Entries" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E101-A, no. 9, pp. 1412-1419, September 2018, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1412.
Abstract: The family of stable matching problems have been well-studied across a wide field of research areas, including economics, mathematics and computer science. In general, an instance of a stable matching problem is given by a set of participants who have expressed their preferences of each other, and asks to find a “stable” matching, that is, a pairing of the participants such that no unpaired participants prefer each other to their assigned partners. In the case of the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), it is known that given an even number n of participants, there might not exist a stable matching that pairs all of the participants, but there exist efficient algorithms to determine if this is possible or not, and if it is possible, produce such a matching. Common extensions of SR allow for the participants' preference lists to be incomplete, or include indifference. Allowing indifference in turn, gives rise to different possible definitions of stability, super, strong, and weak stability. While instances asking for super and strongly stable matching can be efficiently solved even if preference lists are incomplete, the case of weak stability is NP-complete. We examine a restricted case of indifference, introducing the concept of unranked entries. For this type of instances, we show that the problem of finding a weakly stable matching remains NP-complete even if each participant has a complete preference list with at most two unranked entries, or is herself unranked for up to three other participants. On the other hand, for instances where there are m acceptable pairs and there are in total k unranked entries in all of the participants' preference lists, we propose an O(2kn2)-time and polynomial space algorithm that finds a stable matching, or determines that none exists in the given instance.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1412/_p
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@ARTICLE{e101-a_9_1412,
author={Hiroaki SUTO, Aleksandar SHURBEVSKI, Hiroshi NAGAMOCHI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={The Stable Roommates Problem with Unranked Entries},
year={2018},
volume={E101-A},
number={9},
pages={1412-1419},
abstract={The family of stable matching problems have been well-studied across a wide field of research areas, including economics, mathematics and computer science. In general, an instance of a stable matching problem is given by a set of participants who have expressed their preferences of each other, and asks to find a “stable” matching, that is, a pairing of the participants such that no unpaired participants prefer each other to their assigned partners. In the case of the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), it is known that given an even number n of participants, there might not exist a stable matching that pairs all of the participants, but there exist efficient algorithms to determine if this is possible or not, and if it is possible, produce such a matching. Common extensions of SR allow for the participants' preference lists to be incomplete, or include indifference. Allowing indifference in turn, gives rise to different possible definitions of stability, super, strong, and weak stability. While instances asking for super and strongly stable matching can be efficiently solved even if preference lists are incomplete, the case of weak stability is NP-complete. We examine a restricted case of indifference, introducing the concept of unranked entries. For this type of instances, we show that the problem of finding a weakly stable matching remains NP-complete even if each participant has a complete preference list with at most two unranked entries, or is herself unranked for up to three other participants. On the other hand, for instances where there are m acceptable pairs and there are in total k unranked entries in all of the participants' preference lists, we propose an O(2kn2)-time and polynomial space algorithm that finds a stable matching, or determines that none exists in the given instance.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1412},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={September},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - The Stable Roommates Problem with Unranked Entries
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1412
EP - 1419
AU - Hiroaki SUTO
AU - Aleksandar SHURBEVSKI
AU - Hiroshi NAGAMOCHI
PY - 2018
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1412
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E101-A
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - September 2018
AB - The family of stable matching problems have been well-studied across a wide field of research areas, including economics, mathematics and computer science. In general, an instance of a stable matching problem is given by a set of participants who have expressed their preferences of each other, and asks to find a “stable” matching, that is, a pairing of the participants such that no unpaired participants prefer each other to their assigned partners. In the case of the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), it is known that given an even number n of participants, there might not exist a stable matching that pairs all of the participants, but there exist efficient algorithms to determine if this is possible or not, and if it is possible, produce such a matching. Common extensions of SR allow for the participants' preference lists to be incomplete, or include indifference. Allowing indifference in turn, gives rise to different possible definitions of stability, super, strong, and weak stability. While instances asking for super and strongly stable matching can be efficiently solved even if preference lists are incomplete, the case of weak stability is NP-complete. We examine a restricted case of indifference, introducing the concept of unranked entries. For this type of instances, we show that the problem of finding a weakly stable matching remains NP-complete even if each participant has a complete preference list with at most two unranked entries, or is herself unranked for up to three other participants. On the other hand, for instances where there are m acceptable pairs and there are in total k unranked entries in all of the participants' preference lists, we propose an O(2kn2)-time and polynomial space algorithm that finds a stable matching, or determines that none exists in the given instance.
ER -