The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Esta investigação propõe dois métodos para incorporar backdoors no módulo RSA N=pq em vez de no expoente público e. Esta estratégia não só permite que os fabricantes incorporem backdoors em um sistema RSA, mas também permite que os usuários escolham qualquer expoente público desejado, como e=216+1, para garantir criptografia eficiente. Este trabalho utiliza ataque em rede e ataque exaustivo para incorporar backdoors em dois métodos propostos, chamados RSASBLT e RSASBES, respectivamente. Ambas as abordagens envolvem etapas simples, tornando seu tempo de execução aproximadamente igual ao tempo normal de geração de chave RSA, o que implica que ninguém pode detectar o backdoor observando a imparidade de tempo.
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Hung-Min SUN, Mu-En WU, Cheng-Ta YANG, "Simple Backdoors on RSA Modulus by Using RSA Vulnerability" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 9, pp. 2326-2332, September 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2326.
Abstract: This investigation proposes two methods for embedding backdoors in the RSA modulus N=pq rather than in the public exponent e. This strategy not only permits manufacturers to embed backdoors in an RSA system, but also allows users to choose any desired public exponent, such as e=216+1, to ensure efficient encryption. This work utilizes lattice attack and exhaustive attack to embed backdoors in two proposed methods, called RSASBLT and RSASBES, respectively. Both approaches involve straightforward steps, making their running time roughly the same as that of normal RSA key-generation time, implying that no one can detect the backdoor by observing time imparity.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2326/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_9_2326,
author={Hung-Min SUN, Mu-En WU, Cheng-Ta YANG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Simple Backdoors on RSA Modulus by Using RSA Vulnerability},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={9},
pages={2326-2332},
abstract={This investigation proposes two methods for embedding backdoors in the RSA modulus N=pq rather than in the public exponent e. This strategy not only permits manufacturers to embed backdoors in an RSA system, but also allows users to choose any desired public exponent, such as e=216+1, to ensure efficient encryption. This work utilizes lattice attack and exhaustive attack to embed backdoors in two proposed methods, called RSASBLT and RSASBES, respectively. Both approaches involve straightforward steps, making their running time roughly the same as that of normal RSA key-generation time, implying that no one can detect the backdoor by observing time imparity.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2326},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={September},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Simple Backdoors on RSA Modulus by Using RSA Vulnerability
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2326
EP - 2332
AU - Hung-Min SUN
AU - Mu-En WU
AU - Cheng-Ta YANG
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2326
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - September 2009
AB - This investigation proposes two methods for embedding backdoors in the RSA modulus N=pq rather than in the public exponent e. This strategy not only permits manufacturers to embed backdoors in an RSA system, but also allows users to choose any desired public exponent, such as e=216+1, to ensure efficient encryption. This work utilizes lattice attack and exhaustive attack to embed backdoors in two proposed methods, called RSASBLT and RSASBES, respectively. Both approaches involve straightforward steps, making their running time roughly the same as that of normal RSA key-generation time, implying that no one can detect the backdoor by observing time imparity.
ER -