The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Este artigo mostra dois ataques de análise de potência contra uma implementação de software de um algoritmo S-box resistente a DPA de primeira ordem que é baseado na Transformada Discreta de Fourier (DFT). O algoritmo S-box resistente a DPA baseado em DFT foi proposto por Prouff et al. em 2006 e melhorado por Coron et al. em 2008, respectivamente. Em nossos ataques contra o melhorado, pré-processamos os traços de poder, separando-os em dois subgrupos, para que cada um tenha uma máscara tendenciosa. Para os traços de potência separados, são propostos dois métodos de pós-análise para identificar a chave. Um é baseado no ataque DPA contra um subgrupo, e o outro utiliza a diferença de médias para dois subgrupos e uma correspondência de padrões. Finalmente, comparamos esses dois métodos de ataque e propomos uma contramedida em nível de algoritmo para aumentar a segurança do cálculo S-box baseado na DFT.
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Yang LI, Kazuo SAKIYAMA, Shinichi KAWAMURA, Kazuo OHTA, "Power Analysis against a DPA-Resistant S-Box Implementation Based on the Fourier Transform" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E94-A, no. 1, pp. 191-199, January 2011, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191.
Abstract: This paper shows two power analysis attacks against a software implementation of a first-order DPA resistant S-box algorithm that is based on the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The DPA resistant S-box algorithm based on DFT was proposed by Prouff et al. in 2006 and improved by Coron et al. in 2008, respectively. In our attacks against the improved one, we pre-process the power traces by separating them into two subgroups, so that each has a biased mask. For the separated power traces, two post analysis methods are proposed to identify the key. One is based on DPA attack against one subgroup, and the other utilizes the difference of means for two subgroups and a pattern matching. Finally, we compare these two attack methods and propose an algorithm-level countermeasure to enhance the security of S-box calculation based on the DFT.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191/_p
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@ARTICLE{e94-a_1_191,
author={Yang LI, Kazuo SAKIYAMA, Shinichi KAWAMURA, Kazuo OHTA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Power Analysis against a DPA-Resistant S-Box Implementation Based on the Fourier Transform},
year={2011},
volume={E94-A},
number={1},
pages={191-199},
abstract={This paper shows two power analysis attacks against a software implementation of a first-order DPA resistant S-box algorithm that is based on the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The DPA resistant S-box algorithm based on DFT was proposed by Prouff et al. in 2006 and improved by Coron et al. in 2008, respectively. In our attacks against the improved one, we pre-process the power traces by separating them into two subgroups, so that each has a biased mask. For the separated power traces, two post analysis methods are proposed to identify the key. One is based on DPA attack against one subgroup, and the other utilizes the difference of means for two subgroups and a pattern matching. Finally, we compare these two attack methods and propose an algorithm-level countermeasure to enhance the security of S-box calculation based on the DFT.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Power Analysis against a DPA-Resistant S-Box Implementation Based on the Fourier Transform
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 191
EP - 199
AU - Yang LI
AU - Kazuo SAKIYAMA
AU - Shinichi KAWAMURA
AU - Kazuo OHTA
PY - 2011
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E94-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2011
AB - This paper shows two power analysis attacks against a software implementation of a first-order DPA resistant S-box algorithm that is based on the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The DPA resistant S-box algorithm based on DFT was proposed by Prouff et al. in 2006 and improved by Coron et al. in 2008, respectively. In our attacks against the improved one, we pre-process the power traces by separating them into two subgroups, so that each has a biased mask. For the separated power traces, two post analysis methods are proposed to identify the key. One is based on DPA attack against one subgroup, and the other utilizes the difference of means for two subgroups and a pattern matching. Finally, we compare these two attack methods and propose an algorithm-level countermeasure to enhance the security of S-box calculation based on the DFT.
ER -