The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Assinaturas inegáveis, introduzidas por Chaum e van Antwerpen, exigem que um verificador interaja com o signatário para verificar uma assinatura e, portanto, permite que o signatário controle a verificabilidade de suas assinaturas. Assinaturas inegáveis conversíveis, introduzidas por Boyar, Chaum, Damgård e Pedersen, além disso, permitem ao signatário converter assinaturas em assinaturas publicamente verificáveis, divulgando um token de verificação, seja para assinaturas individuais ou para todas as assinaturas universalmente. Além disso, a definição original permite ao signatário delegar a capacidade de provar a validade e converter assinaturas a um terceiro semiconfiável, fornecendo uma chave de verificação. Embora esta funcionalidade seja implementada pelos primeiros esquemas de assinatura inegável conversíveis, os esquemas mais recentes não consideram esta forma de delegação, apesar do seu apelo prático. Neste artigo apresentamos uma definição atualizada e um modelo de segurança para esquemas que permitem delegação e, além disso, destacamos uma nova propriedade de segurança essencial, a solidez do token, que não é formalmente tratada nos modelos de segurança anteriores para assinaturas inegáveis conversíveis. Propomos então um novo esquema de assinatura inegável conversível. O esquema permite delegação de verificação e é comprovadamente seguro no modelo padrão, assumindo que o problema computacional co-Diffie-Hellman, um problema intimamente relacionado, e o problema linear de decisão são difíceis. Além disso, ao contrário dos esquemas recentemente propostos por Phong et al. e Huang et al., nosso esquema comprovadamente atende a todos os requisitos de segurança, ao mesmo tempo que fornece assinaturas curtas.
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Jacob C. N. SCHULDT, Kanta MATSUURA, "Efficient Convertible Undeniable Signatures with Delegatable Verification" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E94-A, no. 1, pp. 71-83, January 2011, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.71.
Abstract: Undeniable signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen, require a verifier to interact with the signer to verify a signature, and hence allow the signer to control the verifiability of his signatures. Convertible undeniable signatures, introduced by Boyar, Chaum, Damgård, and Pedersen, furthermore allow the signer to convert signatures to publicly verifiable ones by publicizing a verification token, either for individual signatures or for all signatures universally. In addition, the original definition allows the signer to delegate the ability to prove validity and convert signatures to a semi-trusted third party by providing a verification key. While this functionality is implemented by the early convertible undeniable signature schemes, most recent schemes do not consider this form of delegation despite its practical appeal. In this paper we present an updated definition and security model for schemes allowing delegation, and furthermore highlight a new essential security property, token soundness, which is not formally treated in the previous security models for convertible undeniable signatures. We then propose a new convertible undeniable signature scheme. The scheme allows delegation of verification and is provably secure in the standard model assuming the computational co-Diffie-Hellman problem, a closely related problem, and the decisional linear problem are hard. Furthermore, unlike the recently proposed schemes by Phong et al. and Huang et al., our scheme provably fulfills all security requirements while providing short signatures.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E94.A.71/_p
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@ARTICLE{e94-a_1_71,
author={Jacob C. N. SCHULDT, Kanta MATSUURA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Efficient Convertible Undeniable Signatures with Delegatable Verification},
year={2011},
volume={E94-A},
number={1},
pages={71-83},
abstract={Undeniable signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen, require a verifier to interact with the signer to verify a signature, and hence allow the signer to control the verifiability of his signatures. Convertible undeniable signatures, introduced by Boyar, Chaum, Damgård, and Pedersen, furthermore allow the signer to convert signatures to publicly verifiable ones by publicizing a verification token, either for individual signatures or for all signatures universally. In addition, the original definition allows the signer to delegate the ability to prove validity and convert signatures to a semi-trusted third party by providing a verification key. While this functionality is implemented by the early convertible undeniable signature schemes, most recent schemes do not consider this form of delegation despite its practical appeal. In this paper we present an updated definition and security model for schemes allowing delegation, and furthermore highlight a new essential security property, token soundness, which is not formally treated in the previous security models for convertible undeniable signatures. We then propose a new convertible undeniable signature scheme. The scheme allows delegation of verification and is provably secure in the standard model assuming the computational co-Diffie-Hellman problem, a closely related problem, and the decisional linear problem are hard. Furthermore, unlike the recently proposed schemes by Phong et al. and Huang et al., our scheme provably fulfills all security requirements while providing short signatures.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E94.A.71},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Efficient Convertible Undeniable Signatures with Delegatable Verification
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 71
EP - 83
AU - Jacob C. N. SCHULDT
AU - Kanta MATSUURA
PY - 2011
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.71
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E94-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2011
AB - Undeniable signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen, require a verifier to interact with the signer to verify a signature, and hence allow the signer to control the verifiability of his signatures. Convertible undeniable signatures, introduced by Boyar, Chaum, Damgård, and Pedersen, furthermore allow the signer to convert signatures to publicly verifiable ones by publicizing a verification token, either for individual signatures or for all signatures universally. In addition, the original definition allows the signer to delegate the ability to prove validity and convert signatures to a semi-trusted third party by providing a verification key. While this functionality is implemented by the early convertible undeniable signature schemes, most recent schemes do not consider this form of delegation despite its practical appeal. In this paper we present an updated definition and security model for schemes allowing delegation, and furthermore highlight a new essential security property, token soundness, which is not formally treated in the previous security models for convertible undeniable signatures. We then propose a new convertible undeniable signature scheme. The scheme allows delegation of verification and is provably secure in the standard model assuming the computational co-Diffie-Hellman problem, a closely related problem, and the decisional linear problem are hard. Furthermore, unlike the recently proposed schemes by Phong et al. and Huang et al., our scheme provably fulfills all security requirements while providing short signatures.
ER -