The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
No contexto da Web 2.0, a interação entre usuários e recursos é cada vez mais frequente no processo de compartilhamento e consumo de recursos. No entanto, a investigação actual sobre a precificação dos recursos centra-se principalmente nos atributos do próprio recurso e não pondera os interesses dos participantes na partilha de recursos. Para lidar com esses problemas, o mecanismo de precificação da avaliação da interação recurso-usuário baseado na teoria dos jogos multiagentes é estabelecido neste artigo. Além disso, a similaridade do usuário, o viés de avaliação baseado na análise de links e a punição de trapaças em grupos acadêmicos também estão incluídos no modelo. Com base nos dados de 181 estudiosos e 509 artigos do banco de dados Wanfang, este artigo conduz 5483 experimentos de precificação durante 13 meses, e os resultados mostram que este modelo é mais eficaz do que outros modelos de precificação - a precisão de precificação dos recursos de recursos é de 94.2%, e a precisão da avaliação do valor do usuário é de 96.4%. Além disso, este modelo pode mostrar intuitivamente o relacionamento entre usuários e recursos. O estudo de caso também demonstra que o nível de conhecimento do usuário não está positivamente correlacionado com a sua autoridade. Descobrir e punir a trapaça em grupos acadêmicos conduz à avaliação objetiva de pesquisadores e recursos. O mecanismo de precificação dos recursos científicos e tecnológicos e dos usuários proposto neste artigo tem como premissa o comércio justo de recursos científicos e tecnológicos.
Fanying ZHENG
Zhejiang University
Fu GU
Zhejiang University
Yangjian JI
Zhejiang University
Jianfeng GUO
Chinese Academy of Sciences,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Xinjian GU
Zhejiang University
Jin ZHANG
Zhejiang University
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Fanying ZHENG, Fu GU, Yangjian JI, Jianfeng GUO, Xinjian GU, Jin ZHANG, "Consumption Pricing Mechanism of Scientific and Technological Resources Based on Multi-Agent Game Theory: An Interactive Analytical Model and Experimental Validation" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E104-D, no. 8, pp. 1292-1301, August 2021, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2020BDP0020.
Abstract: In the context of Web 2.0, the interaction between users and resources is more and more frequent in the process of resource sharing and consumption. However, the current research on resource pricing mainly focuses on the attributes of the resource itself, and does not weigh the interests of the resource sharing participants. In order to deal with these problems, the pricing mechanism of resource-user interaction evaluation based on multi-agent game theory is established in this paper. Moreover, the user similarity, the evaluation bias based on link analysis and punishment of academic group cheating are also included in the model. Based on the data of 181 scholars and 509 articles from the Wanfang database, this paper conducts 5483 pricing experiments for 13 months, and the results show that this model is more effective than other pricing models - the pricing accuracy of resource resources is 94.2%, and the accuracy of user value evaluation is 96.4%. Besides, this model can intuitively show the relationship within users and within resources. The case study also exhibits that the user's knowledge level is not positively correlated with his or her authority. Discovering and punishing academic group cheating is conducive to objectively evaluating researchers and resources. The pricing mechanism of scientific and technological resources and the users proposed in this paper is the premise of fair trade of scientific and technological resources.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2020BDP0020/_p
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@ARTICLE{e104-d_8_1292,
author={Fanying ZHENG, Fu GU, Yangjian JI, Jianfeng GUO, Xinjian GU, Jin ZHANG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Consumption Pricing Mechanism of Scientific and Technological Resources Based on Multi-Agent Game Theory: An Interactive Analytical Model and Experimental Validation},
year={2021},
volume={E104-D},
number={8},
pages={1292-1301},
abstract={In the context of Web 2.0, the interaction between users and resources is more and more frequent in the process of resource sharing and consumption. However, the current research on resource pricing mainly focuses on the attributes of the resource itself, and does not weigh the interests of the resource sharing participants. In order to deal with these problems, the pricing mechanism of resource-user interaction evaluation based on multi-agent game theory is established in this paper. Moreover, the user similarity, the evaluation bias based on link analysis and punishment of academic group cheating are also included in the model. Based on the data of 181 scholars and 509 articles from the Wanfang database, this paper conducts 5483 pricing experiments for 13 months, and the results show that this model is more effective than other pricing models - the pricing accuracy of resource resources is 94.2%, and the accuracy of user value evaluation is 96.4%. Besides, this model can intuitively show the relationship within users and within resources. The case study also exhibits that the user's knowledge level is not positively correlated with his or her authority. Discovering and punishing academic group cheating is conducive to objectively evaluating researchers and resources. The pricing mechanism of scientific and technological resources and the users proposed in this paper is the premise of fair trade of scientific and technological resources.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2020BDP0020},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={August},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Consumption Pricing Mechanism of Scientific and Technological Resources Based on Multi-Agent Game Theory: An Interactive Analytical Model and Experimental Validation
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1292
EP - 1301
AU - Fanying ZHENG
AU - Fu GU
AU - Yangjian JI
AU - Jianfeng GUO
AU - Xinjian GU
AU - Jin ZHANG
PY - 2021
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2020BDP0020
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E104-D
IS - 8
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - August 2021
AB - In the context of Web 2.0, the interaction between users and resources is more and more frequent in the process of resource sharing and consumption. However, the current research on resource pricing mainly focuses on the attributes of the resource itself, and does not weigh the interests of the resource sharing participants. In order to deal with these problems, the pricing mechanism of resource-user interaction evaluation based on multi-agent game theory is established in this paper. Moreover, the user similarity, the evaluation bias based on link analysis and punishment of academic group cheating are also included in the model. Based on the data of 181 scholars and 509 articles from the Wanfang database, this paper conducts 5483 pricing experiments for 13 months, and the results show that this model is more effective than other pricing models - the pricing accuracy of resource resources is 94.2%, and the accuracy of user value evaluation is 96.4%. Besides, this model can intuitively show the relationship within users and within resources. The case study also exhibits that the user's knowledge level is not positively correlated with his or her authority. Discovering and punishing academic group cheating is conducive to objectively evaluating researchers and resources. The pricing mechanism of scientific and technological resources and the users proposed in this paper is the premise of fair trade of scientific and technological resources.
ER -